Optionally, a certificate can contain start and end dates, when it starts and ceases to be valid. End dates are especially common, since most CAs consider it good policy to require a certificate to be renewed from time to time. Not only does it enable them to check that the holder is still genuine, but it enables them to charge for renewing the certificate.
It is sometimes necessary for a CA to revoke a certificate, for example if the holder's matching private key is lost or revealed, or if the CA ceases to consider the holder trustworthy. There are two ways a CA can do this. Both have shortcomings.
The first is to maintain a certificate revocation list (CRL), which it makes remotely accessible. A CRL can be installed in SSL software, for example in a browser, and when the SSL software is examining a certificate to see if it is trustworthy, part of the procedure is to see if the certificate is on any of the installed CRLs.
This approach has the problem that CA updates are issued periodically, so there is a delay between a CA deciding to revoke a certificate and the fact appearing in the latest issue of the CRL.
A more recent solution is for the CA to provide online certificate status - meaning that SSL software checking a certificate can contact the CA's server online and get a signed response saying whether the certificate has been revoked. The Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) has been introduced for this.
This approach has the problem that it puts a high load on the CA's server.